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Between Facts and Utopia: Habermas and Benhabib from Deliberative Democracy
to Democratic Deficits
Chairperson: David Sherman
The thesis proposes to examine two accounts o f democratic legitimation and
institutionalization within the deliberative democracy tradition o f political theory.
The normative principles grounding these accounts are derived from discourse
ethics. The first section begins by examining the attempt by Jurgen Habermas to
ground the validity of moral norms in a neo-Kantian transcendental account o f an
“ideal speech situation” as well as the rejection o f such an account by Seyla Benhabib
in a neo-Hegelian critique. The first section then explores the attempts in deliberative
democracy by Habermas and Benhabib to ground a procedural account o f
democratic legitimation in normative principles derived from discourse ethics and
their institutionalization in a civic public sphere.
The second section begins by dealing with two o f the major traditional criticisms
identified by Seyla Benhabib against deliberative democracy, the liberal criticism that
such an account cannot adequately guarantee individual rights and autonomy, and
the institutional realist critique that the principles o f deliberative democracy are not
capable o f institutionalization in modem, complex societies. In meeting these
objections from the broader tradition o f modern democratic political theory, both
Habermas and Benhabib emphasize the compatibility o f deliberative democracy with
existing political institutions. I argue that deliberative democracy then risks
generating an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and equal
participation generated by discourse ethics and their own institutional account The
central issue here is that while analytically separating the civil public sphere and its
own logic from other social spheres like the cultural or economic, both democratic
theorists fail sufficiently to subsequently thematize the public sphere’s relation to
other social spheres and the possible intrusions o f these spheres into deliberative
bodies in such a manner as to constitute democratic deficits. I endorse Nancy
Fraser’s work as a more adequate account o f deliberative democracy for these
reasons. I conclude that deliberative democratic theory should be seen less as an
account o f the legitimation o f existing democratic institutions than as normative
grounds for pushing for the further democratization o f political, economic, and
cultural institutions.
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Section One
DISCOURSE ETHICS TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

I propose to examine two accounts of democratic legitimation and
institutionalization within the deliberative democracy tradition o f political theory.

The

normative principles grounding these accounts are derived from discourse ethics, the central
principle o f which is as follows: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could
meet) with the approval o f all affected in their capacity asparticipants in a practical discourse. ’*
While agreeing on the principal norm o f discourse ethics, Jurgen Habermas and Seyla
Benhabib disagree on its justification. The first sub-section examines Habermas’ neoKantian account, which attempts to ground the validity o f moral norms in the quasitranscendental presuppositions that purportedly underlie discursive argumentation,
presuppositions that prefigure ‘an ideal speech situation.’ Benhabib rejects such an account
in a neo-Hegelian critique and proposes an alternative justification o f communicative ethics
as a form o f practical rationality that is a world historical and collective achievement,
insisting then on both its historical and sociological specificity as well as its claim to a validity
that is culture-transcending. The difference in justifications results in different conceptions
o f the relation o f morality to ethics in the communicative paradigm. While Habermas insists
on a strict separation, insisting that the function o f discourse ethics is to ground universal
moral norms, Benhabib includes ethical contents in her conception, proposing to add a
community o f needs and solidarity to that community o f rights envisioned by Habermas.

1 Jurgen Habermas. “Discourse Ethics: Notes Toward a Program o f Justification,” Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), p. 67
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The second sub-section explores the attempts by Habermas and Benhabib to ground
a procedural account o f democratic legitimation in principles derived from discourse ethics
and to institutionalize them in a civic public sphere. While abandoning his commitment to
both a quasi-transcendental justification and a strict separation o f the moral and ethical
realms, Habermas still formulates his account o f democratic legitimation in very Kantian
terms. Since in modem societies, the legislators and subjects o f law are distinct, in contrast
to the Kantian conception o f autonomy, the point of political theory, as Habermas sees it, is
to again mediate the two in order to develop adequate accounts o f both private and public
autonomy. In complex, m odem societies, Habermas sees this happening primarily in the
deliberations o f the civil, public sphere. The m odem political tradition, typified for
Habermas by the liberal and republican conceptions, fails to do justice to public and private
autonomy by privileging either one form o f autonomy or the other, and thus fails to see their
mutual dependence. Only in a procedural account, Habermas argues, can their co-originary
status be properly articulated. While sharing Habermas’ general formulation o f deliberative
democracy and its emphasis on the civil public sphere, Benhabib differentiates herself in
taking the primary object o f public discourse to be not only the administration o f power by
the state but the norms regulating social action between actors that do not require coercion.
In a parallel fashion then to her critique o f Habermas’ formulation o f discourse ethics,
Benhabib argues that Habermas’ account o f deliberative democracy still suffers from a
Kantian narrowness, with the overriding concern being now with law instead o f morality.
Such a conception for Benhabib again unnecessarily and unjustifiably truncates discursive
potentials.
The second section begins by dealing with two o f the major traditional criticisms
identified by Seyla Benhabib against deliberative democracy, the liberal criticism that such an
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account cannot adequately guarantee individual rights and autonomy, and the institutional
realist critique that the principles o f deliberative democracy are not capable o f
institutionalization in modem, complex societies. In an attempt to meet these objections
from the broader tradition o f m odem democratic political theory, both Habermas and
Benhabib emphasize that their deliberative democratic accounts are compatible with existing
political institutions. But if this is the case, I argue, deliberative democracy risks generating
an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and equal participation generated
by discourse ethics and their own institutional account. The central issue here is that while
analytically separating the civil public sphere and its own logic from other social spheres like
the cultural or economic, both democratic theorists fail sufficiently to subsequently
thematize the public sphere’s relation to other social spheres and the possible intrusions o f
these spheres into deliberative bodies in such a manner as to constitute democratic deficits.
I conclude that deliberative democratic theory should be seen less as an account o f the
legitimation o f existing democratic institutions than as normative grounds for pushing for the
further democratization o f political, economic, and cultural institutions.

1.1 Habermas and Benhabib on Discourse Ethics

Both Benhabib’s and Habermas’ projects originate at the same point: the by-nowwell familiar impasse o f the Frankfurt School. “If the plight o f the Enlightenment and of
cultural rationalization only reveals the culmination o f the identity logic, constitutive o f
reason, then the theory o f the dialectic o f Enlightenment, which is carried out with the tools
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o f this very same reason, perpetuates the very structure o f domination it condemns.”2 The
reason for this impasse, Habermas argued, was the work-centered philosophy o f history the
Frankfurt School had inherited from Marx. The irony o f the Frankfurt School, however,
was to eliminate the progressive and normative implications in a progressive notion o f
modernity that Marx himself had relied on. The real was rational, but increasing
rationalization was only progressive domination. Consequently, in The Dialectic of
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adom o were led to posit an ‘other’ o f reason in aesthetic
mimesis. But relegated to advanced avant-garde art, such a conception left theoretical
critique and emancipatory political praxis without a foundation.

Habermas has over the last forty years attempted the Herculean task of
reconstructing critical theory’s social-theoretic and normative foundations around the terms
o f language and communication. Habermas’ first attempt at the reconstruction o f critical
theory’s normative foundations took a very self-consciously Kantian form in its emphasis on
autonomy and self-legislation. Only those universalizable norms which moral agents will
themselves are valid. Habermas’ procedural account though differs from Kant’s in its
dialogical character. It is not the moral agent in self-reflection that tests the universalizability
o f a maxim, but actual moral agents in discussion. This principle Habermas formulates as:
“Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval o f all
affected in their capacity asparticipants in a practical discourse.

Habermas’ account then

focuses not on the ideal faculties o f a moral agent, but on the conditions o f moral discourse
that would validate the result: a sincere dialogue open to all participants, topics, and demands

2 Seyla Benhabib. Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study in the Foundations o f Critical Theory,. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 169
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for justification. Whereas Kant constructed an ideal agent reflecting on his actual reason,
Habermas models morality on actual participants in an ‘ideal speech situation.’ The ideal
speech situation specifies the “formal properties that discursive argumentations would have
to possess if the consensus thus attained were to be distinguished from a mere compromise
or an agreement o f convenience.”4 It is less something actual that occurs, or some telos to
aim at as an ideal society, than a regulative principle by which to normatively judge actual
moral dialogue. It is in this manner that he hopes to evade the traditional Hegelian
objections o f abstraction and otherworldliness to a Kantian account.

Seyla Benhabib has been a sympathetic fellow traveler in critical theory’s
communicative turn, but she has been an equally austere critic o f its Kantian formulation.
Habermas argues that the constraints on moral discourse envisioned by the “ideal speech
situation” are presumed by competent argumentation as such. While accepting the general
formulation o f discourse ethics —a moral discourse open to all participants who have equal
rights (demand for justification, initiation o f topics, etc.) within that discourse —Benhabib
rejects Habermas’ quasi-transcendental justification. In Critique, Norm and Utopia, she
systematically outlines her reasons by reformulating Hegelian objections to K ant’s original
account. Whereas for Habermas we are bound to respectful and egalitarian moral discourse
in so far as we are speech users, Benhabib argues that moral respect and egalitarian
reciprocity only have force for a certain kind o f speaker, a post-conventional m odem one.
While this is a contingent fact, it is not an arbitrary one; after the fact o f modernity, so to
speak, arguments can be given to support respectful and egalitarian dialogue. The

3 Jiirgen Habermas. “Discourse Ethics: Notes Toward a Program o f Justification,” Moral Consciousness
and Communicative Action, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), p. 67
4 Benhabib. Critique, Norm, and Utopia, p. 284
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transcendentalist account o f discourse ethics can’t work, because it either just doesn’t follow
from a m in im a l conception o f the rules o f argumentation or surreptitiously presumes
psychological and sociological premises to which it is not entided:
Either this principle explicates the meaning o f rational consent in such a way that nothing
new is added to the available explication o f the argumentation procedure in practical
discourse; or this principle defines the meaning o f rational consent in som e additional way,
but this definition is neither the only one compatible with the accepted rules o f
argumentation, nor can it be said to follow from the rules o f argumentation without the
introduction o f additional assumptions n ot belonging to the specified rules o f argument.5

While Benhabib’s particular arguments against Habermas’ Kantian formulation o f
discourse ethics are Hegelian-inspired, they are part o f a more general line o f inquiry into the
tradition o f critical theory that is really quite imaginative. Going back to Marx’s Capital,
Benhabib distinguishes two contrasting models on social analysis. O n the one hand is the
intersubjective participants’ perspective, which presents crises as “lived phenomena o f
alienation, exploitation, and injustice.”6 O n the other is the transsubjective, theoretician’s
perspective, that o f an outside third-person observer outlining the functional systemic
necessity o f crises. The unfortunate tendency o f first-generation critical theory, Benhabib
believes, has been to privilege the latter perspective, stemming from its continued reliance on
what Benhabib calls the presuppositions o f a “philosophy o f the subject.”
First, that there is a unitary m odel o f human activity which can be defined as ‘objectification’
or ‘production’; second, that history is constituted by the activities o f this one subject —
humanity or mankind. Third, that human history presents the unfolding o f the capacities o f
this one subject; and fourth, that emancipation consists in our becom ing conscious o f and
acting in accordance with the knowledge that the constituting and constituted subjects o f
history —the subject o f the past and the subject o f the future —are one.7

The collective historical subject is for Benhabib a fiction that comes at the cost o f fa ilin g to
acknowledge human plurality. “ (The] shift to the language o f an anonymous species-subject
preempts the experience o f moral and political activity as a consequence of which alone a

5 Ibid., p. 308
6 Ibid., p. 123
7 Ibid., pp. 129-130
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genuine ‘we’ can emerge. A collectivity is not constituted theoretically but is formed out o f
the moral and political struggles o f fighting actors.”8
Against his own anti-teleological and anti-metaphysical intentions, Habermas’
schema o f evolutionary naturalism also falls victim to this trend. While replacing teleology
with a developmental logic o f cognitive learning potentials aimed at solving problems within
historical processes, social actors nonetheless become mere identical bearers o f functional
imperatives:
Habermas reverts to the discourse o f the philosophy o f the subject at those points in his
theory w hen the reconstruction o f species competencies o f an anonymous subject —
humanity as such —does n ot remain merely a fruitful research hypothesis, but assumes the
role o f a philosophical narrative o f the formative history o f the subject o f history.9

This perspective is no less apparent in Habermas’ discourse ethics. In treating discourse
ethics as a sphere o f deliberation over norms that can be freely and consensually agreed
upon by all concerned, Habermas treats this ‘all’ as a homogenous, undifferentiated mass, or,
in so far as they are individuals, treats those individuals only in terms o f their commonality.
This leads Habermas to separate the ethical sphere from moral discourse. H e excludes the
ethical on the grounds that conceptions o f the good life cannot be reconciled with the
principle o f universality. But the history o f actual political and moral struggles has not been
so exclusive. The fights have been as much over needs and identity as they have been over
rights. The collectivity o f discourse participants that Habermas would like to exclude from
considering the ethical is a product o f those very ethical discourses.
Unlike Hegel, however, Benhabib’s attempt to incorporate the ethical sphere into
discourse ethics does not have a conservative trajectory. She argues instead that it is the
Kantian formulation that truncates normative discourse. Contra Hegel, Benhabib is not a

8 Ibid., p. 331
9 Ibid., p. 330
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believer in a homogenous ethical totality, which would only reinstate a reifying, third-person
perspective. Her emphasis is instead on the contestation within and between these ethical
horizons by particular social actors. By ignoring the particular life histories o f these actors,
the Kantian perspective misses important ethical distinctions, and perhaps even moral ones.
Sensitivity to particularity and differences, and the attendant ethical cognitions such as love
or caring, would serve to broaden, not constrict moral discourse. Thus, Benhabib argues,
moral discourses should be attuned as much to ‘concrete others’ as to a ‘generalized other.’
It is the perspective o f the ‘generalized other’ that has prevented Habermas from
making good on his own advance o f Kohlberg’s moral theory, an advance that insists on
“universalizable need interpretations.” For Habermas, according to Benhabib, in
“[discourses in which our needs and the cultural traditions shaping them are fhematized, the
semantic content of those interpretations defining happiness and the good life, are brought
to life, and what is fitting, pleasing, and fulfilling are debated are named . . . ‘aestheticexpressive ones.’”10 But then Habermas sharply distinguishes such discourses from the
moral, because he argues they are dependent on concrete, cultural traditions. Habermas
himself, however, implicitly relies on these traditions in his formulation o f the ideal speech
situation, since such rules about inclusivity and symmetry in moral argumentation do not
strictly follow from a pragmatics o f language but already have imbedded in them certain
presuppositions o f fairness and equality. These are presuppositions that Benhabib shares,
but she shares them not because one happens to enter into discourse, but because one is
already situated in a post-conventional, universalist tradition. These discourses then are not
as distinct as Habermas would like. Even in his formulation o f discourse ethics, aestheticexpressive discourses are assumed as given attributes o f the participants involved. These

10 Ibid., p. 338
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discourses, however, are not merely given, nor are aesthetic-expressive discourses only within
a given cultural tradition. By bracketing these considerations through the perspective o f a
‘generalized other’ Habermas robs moral discourse o f much o f its significance.
For Benhabib, needs and their interpretations are something to be argued about and
potentially transformed, not merely as premises on the way to universalizable norms, but
along with norms as the central objectives o f moral discourse. The consequence o f this is
not merely to open up considerations o f particular life histories in regards to norms, but to
overturn any essentiallyprivatistic and individual conception of needs. Rather what is fundamentally
important for Benhabib is the potential o f communication to transform interests and self
interpretations. By making happiness political, and in this Benhabib is self-consciously
following the Frankfurt School, she is also reopening an overly juridical and legalistic
conception o f discourse ethics to deliberation about the good life and the utopian horizon.

Benhabib has argued that the community o f rights must be complemented by that o f
needs and solidarity:
They are the norms o f solidarity, friendship, love, and care. Such relations require in various
ways what I do, and that you expect me to do in face o f your needs, more than would be
requited o f m e as a right-bearing person. In treating you in accordance with the norms o f
solidarity, friendship, love and care, I confirm not only your humanity but your human
individuality.11

By breaking down the barriers o f the traditionally liberal public-private distinction, Benhabib
hopes to incorporate virtues previously relegated to the private realm in public life.
Benhabib states herself that “the norms o f our interaction are usually private, noninstitutional ones.”12 But these virtues may be generally private, not only because the public
sphere has been cold but because the private sphere nourishes them with particular warmth.

11 ibid., p. 341
12 I t . .VI
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Intimacy does not stand in a merely fortuitous relation to love and friendship but as its
ground, an intimacy that the public sphere by definition cannot provide. So with Aristotle
against Plato’s attempt to make the polis into a family, we might wonder whether such a
totalizing conception o f the family might be more damaging to intimacy and these relations
than any benefit the state could gain by them. It’s really quite difficult to see then how
Benhabib’s conception could be translated into political terms. The issue becomes not
merely political affects but one o f participation. To the collective ‘generalized other’
Benhabib counterpoises the individual and his or her particular life history. But it is hard to
imagine how everyone’s particular life history could be accommodated in the political realm.
If Habermas’ moral discourse is too exclusive, Benhabib might seem to stretch the
conditions o f its possibility. Between a spartan universality and a maudlin particularity, both
thinkers might be said to have excluded the political as a realm where commonality and
difference are negotiated and where neither strict consensus nor love can provide an
adequate criterion. While it is notable that Benhabib conceives o f the community of
solidarity and needs as a complement to, not a replacement of, the community o f rights, she
is unable to adequately integrate th em As one eminent critical theorist has stated, what is
needed is a notion o f ‘collective concrete others.’13 It is not then surprising that both
theorists turn to politics quite explicidy in their later work, with the turn from discourse
ethics to deliberative democracy.

13 Nancy Fraser. “Toward a Discourse Ethic o f Solidarity,” Praxis International 5 (January 1986)
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1.2 Habermas’ Account o f Deliberative Democracy

In Habermas’ later work there has been a marked shift from discourse ethics, at least
with respect to its particular attention to the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech
community and its near otherworldly status have been replaced by a focus on actual liberal
democracy. Habermas is renowned for specific engagements with his critics, and while no
explicit and published debate the likes o f which Habermas had with Gadamer and Luhmann
exists with Benhabib, considerations along the likes o f her critique have certainly played a
role in his emerging thought. Unlike the quasi-transcendental presuppositions o f the ideal
speech situation, liberal democracy for Habermas is not a theoretical posit but is taken for
granted as an historical achievement, while Habermas’ critique becomes a more
straightforward and eminent normative critique o f democratic deficits, the fullest elaboration
o f which to date has been his between Facts and Norms.
This is not to say that discourse ethics itself has disappeared, for the best account o f
democratic legitimacy, Habermas and Benhabib both argue, is to be found in a deliberative
account o f democracy, an enterprise that draws heavily on the theory o f discourse ethics and
its idea o f unconstrained dialogue among free and equal participants. This is m ost evident in
the articulation o f the public sphere. Habermas finds here a discourse with its own built-in
ideality. The normative constraints here are not a transcendental, theoretical posit but
historically achieved rights; civic rights, political rights, and finally in the twentieth century,
social rights all become conditions o f free and equal participation. Achieved through
political struggle and moral discourse, they are themselves subject to continuing
interpretation in the public sphere.

11

Surrendering the transcendental justification has also opened up Habermas’
conception o f moral discourse. N o longer a specialized discourse, the public sphere finds its
epitome in the everyday face-to-face conversation in which specialized discourses
intermingle and the theoretician’s voice finds no particular privilege.
T o be sure, ethical discourses aimed at achieving a collective self-understanding —discourses
in which participants attempt to clarify how they understand themselves as members o f a
particular nation, as members o f a community or a state, as inhabitants o f a region, etc.,
which traditions they wish to cultivate, h ow they should treat each other, minorities, and
marginal groups, in what sort o f society they want to live —constitute an important part o f
politics.14

Habermas’ new theory is also much more attentive to the notion o f “difference” in
democratic discourse and the need to include those voices without which formal rights risk
perpetuating substantive inequalities.15 Rather than essentializing “difference,” Habermas
argues that adequate recognition for minorities, or individuals more generally, can only be
achieved through a procedural account that integrates both private and public autonomy.
For Habermas, it is as members o f civil society that individuals exercise their private autonomy.
“As bearers o f individual rights, citizens enjoy the protections o f the government as long as
they pursue their private interests within the boundaries drawn by legal statutes.”16 It is as
political citizens that individuals exercise their public autonomy. Political rights “guarantee
instead the possibility o f participating in a common practice, through which the citizens can
first make themselves into what they want to be— politically responsible subjects o f a
community o f free and equal citizens.” 17 In fact, Habermas’ account is meant to show that
there are no viable private rights without public autonomy, that the equal value o f rights
cannot be protected without open and public deliberation about what these tights mean and
what their (different) effects are upon the populace. “For, in the final analysis, private legal

14Jurgen Habermas, ed. Ciaron Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,”
The Inclusion o f the Other, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 244
15 Habermas takes feminism as his model here.
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subjects cannot enjoy even equal individual liberties if they themselves do not jointly exercise
their civic autonomy in order to specify clearly which interests and standards are justified,
and to agree on the relevant respects that determine when like cases should be treated alike
and different cases differently.”18

Stemming from his earlier work in discourse ethics, Habermas’ central argument for
deliberative democracy has been that only a proceduralist account o f democracy can do
justice to the two fundamental normative intuitions o f democratic politics, public and private
autonomy. Habermas has explicitly contrasted his account with what he considers the two
traditional accounts o f democratic legitimation, republicanism and liberalism. While
republicanism prioritizes the pole o f public autonomy, liberalism privileges private
autonomy. Only the proceduralist account, Habermas argues, fully integrates the cooriginary nature and interdependence o f public and private autonomy. A t the institutional
level, deliberative democracy attempts to fuse a republican emphasis on direct participation
with liberal structures like the market and constitutional state, hoping thereby to balance
solidarity and democratic will-formation as a means o f steering society with money and
administrative power. Habermas’ attempt to integrate both the normative impetus and
institutional programs o f republicanism and liberalism is both ambitious and elegant.

The internal relation between the rule o f law and democracy for Habermas begins
with the advent o f modernity. With the collapse o f metaphysical paradigms, positive law
must seek legitimacy in the legislation o f autonomous subjects. The law in turn

16 Ibid., p. 240
17 Ibid., p. 241
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institutionalizes this autonomy and gives it sanction and protection. Habermas explicitly
follows K ant in his conception o f both politics and morality, even while giving it a dialogical
turn. In political philosophy, however, unlike morality, the legislator and addressee o f the
law must inevitably be split. Habermas’ motivating concern then becomes how the poles o f
public and private autonomy can be mediated in such a fashion that neither is sacrificed.
The way that the democratic tradition has formulated this tension, however, has left it
irresolvable.
The political autonomy o f citizens is supposed to be em bodied in the self-organization o f a
community that gives itself the laws through the sovereign will o f the people. The private
autonomy o f citizens, on the other hand, is supposed to take the form o f basic rights that
guarantee the anonymous rule o f law. Once the issue is set up in this way, either idea can be
upheld only at the expense o f the other. T he intuitive plausible co-originality o f both ideas
falls by the wayside.19

Republicanism upholds popular sovereignty at the expense o f rights, liberalism rights at the
expense o f popular sovereignty. Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, recognizes that
without popular sovereignty rights can neither achieve their proper articulation nor, under
the conditions o f a post-metaphysical modernity, receive their adequate legitimation.
Similarly, without a system o f rights and positive law, the outcomes o f democratic
deliberations cannot claim legitimacy as the fair exchanges o f free and equal participants.

When citizens judge in the light o f the discourse principle whether the law they make is
legitimate, they do so under communicative presuppositions that must themselves be legally
institutionalized in the form o f political civil rights, and for such institutionalization to occur,
the legal code as such must be available. But in order to establish this legal code it is
necessary to create the status o f legal persons who as bearers o f individual rights belong to a
voluntary association o f citizens and when necessary effectively claim their rights. There is
no law without the private autonomy o f legal persons in general. Consequently, without
basic rights that secure the private autonomy o f citizens there is also no medium for legally
institutionalizing the conditions under which these citizens, as citizens o f a state, can make
use o f their public autonomy. Thus private and public autonomy mutually presuppose each

18Jtirgen Habermas, ed. Ciaron Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. “On the Internal Relation between Law and
Democracy,” The Inclusion o f the Other, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 262
19 Jurgen Habermas. “On the Internal Relation between the Rule o f Law and Democracy,” p. 258
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other in such a way that neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy
over its counterpart20.

These theoretical, normative considerations are not without political, institutional
significance for Habermas. Any attempt to institutionalize one o f the poles o f autonomy
without due integration o f the other is not only an incomplete account o f democracy for
Habermas but a self-undermining one, the welfare state being a case in point. While within
the liberal tradition the conception o f the conditions for the full exercise o f private
autonomy has grown to include a conception o f economic entitlements, the failure to
adequately conceive of the co-otiginary status o f public and private autonomy in the service
of facilitating private autonomy has led to the counterproductive regime o f welfare state
paternalism and normalizing interventions. Rather than underwriting the program o f free and
equal exercise o f individual liberties, welfare recipients’ stigmatisation and regulatory
objectification produces a dependent and dejected population.
The liberal program of equal rights and liberties, lacking the institutionalized means
where those affected by the law have a role in its legislation, can end up working against the
very equality in whose name the program o f the welfare state was carried out.
The individual rights that are meant to guarantee to [citizens] the autonomy to pursue their
lives in the private sphere cannot even be adequately formulated unless the affected persons
themselves first articulate and justify in public debate those aspects that are relevant to equal
or unequal treatment in typical cases. The private autonomy o f equally entided citizens can
be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy21

A proceduralist account proceeds under the assumption that a program o f either public or
private autonomy can only be pursued step in step with the other.

20 Ibid., p. 260
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1.3 Benhabib on Deliberative Democracy

Benhabib draws two major contrasts between deliberative democracy and more
traditional liberalism, as expounded by Rawls. First, debate in Rawls’ account is restricted to
constitutional essentials, whereas deliberative democracy doesn’t preemptively censor topics
o f public discussion. Second, Benhabib’s conception emphasizes real debates over a kind o f
ideal debate seen as a regulative principle. O ne o f Benhabib’s particular criticisms o f
Habermas’ Kantian discourse ethics was the ambiguous relationship in which it stood to
Rawls’ theory: focusing at once on both the dialogue’s actual participants but then only on
what they actually had in common. With deliberative democracy’s public sphere, the
distinction is more strongly pronounced. While Rawls’ theory has expanded as well to
include a public sphere, he situates it restrictively within the political system. His model o f
political and constitutional deliberation is therefore the Supreme Court. Deliberative
democracy’s public sphere is, by contrast, situated outside the political system in varying
strata o f civic society: from political parties, to citizen’s activist groups to conversations at
local coffeehouses.
A t this point Habermas and Benhabib certainly look a lot alike, and one might ask
whether Habermas has just embraced Benhabib’s critique in totality, to which the natural
response may be that it only appears so at first because Benhabib has embraced (too?) much
o f Habermas. To be sure, most o f her discussions o f deliberative democracy —the concern
with public reason, juridicality, and public institutions —have predominated over the
concerns with friendship, love, and caring that she championed in Critique, Norm and Utopia.
O ne does not detect much utopian rhetoric, or much o f an emphasis on 'anticipatory-

21 Ibid., p. 264

16

utopian critique,' in her latest work, such as The Claims of Culture. Have they just split their
differences? A t first glance the difference between The Claims of Culture and Between Facts and
Norms may seem to be whether deliberative democracy is being applied to the realm o f law
or to multiculturalism, whether the public sphere is here being developed in terms o f its
relation to the political system or to a pluralistic society’s culture. I would like to argue that
deeper theoretical differences remain here, and to do so I would like to take up the line o f
argument relating to the differences between deliberative democracy and more traditional
models o f liberalism.
W hat distinguishes deliberative democracy is the importance it gives the public sphere
as a civic institution. For Benhabib, it is this public sphere that allows deliberative democracy
to accommodate a reasonable multiculturalism. W hat is distinctive about Benhabib’s
account is that it is primarily within the public sphere that multicultural dilemmas are to be
resolved. “Deliberative democracy sees the free public sphere o f civil society as the principal
arena for the articulation, contestation, and resolution o f normative discourses.”22 In
addition to the two major contrasts that Benhabib draws between her account and Rawls’,
which are outlined above, there is a third. Deliberative democracy centers its attention on
non-coercive resolutions in the civil sphere over the coercive measures stemming from the
state. With this third condition, it is perhaps worth concentrating not only on Benhabib’s
difference from Rawls but what is arguably her difference from Habermas as well. Certainly
Rawls sees the public sphere as a political institution whose object is political institutions.
While Habermas conceives o f the public sphere as a civic institution, the privileged object of
its deliberation generally seems to be the political system. While by no means excluding the
political system as a topic o f debate, the privileged object o f deliberation in Benhabib is

22 Seyla Benhabib. The Claims o f Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 115
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society itself, without the direct intervention in many cases o f the political system and
legislation. Is Habermas ignoring a crucial dimension o f potentially transformatory political
praxis here, or is Benhabib just being utopian?

Benhabib is still taking a more Hegelian tack on deliberative democracy. W hen the
private-public distinction is blurred, so is the ethical-political. O n the one hand, she argues
that this opens up horizons o f discourse and potential resolutions that a more strictly
Kantian conception suppresses. Benhabib reminds us o f how many moral and human rights
issues, such as women’s liberation, start as ethical “for us” issues. “ [CJlaims and arguments
may change their normative status through democratic deliberation in that ethical considerations
may become universali^ablejustice concerns.”23 Here universalizability and morality are not
prerequisites for entering the public sphere bu t the result o f it. At the same time Benhabib
recognizes some Hegelian limitations. Discourse ethics applies, “if and when the democratic
will o f the participants to do so exists. Let us recall that we engage in discursive practices
when moral and political conflicts occur and when everyday normative certainties have lost
their governance.”24 It is still worth asking whether enough democratic will exists to justify
the emphasis that she puts on discursive resolutions to these dilemmas. Benhabib sidesteps
the issue, perhaps, by noting that in cases o f intense hostility, juridical solutions also have
their limitations.

We are now at a point where we may be able to evaluate the continuing and
sympathetic dispute in critical theory between Benhabib and Habermas in light o f its past.

23Ib id , p. 144

24Ibid.,p. 115

18

Both theorists have undertaken revisions in the move from discourse ethics to deliberative
democracy. Yet certain undercurrents and commitments have not changed. To be sure,
Habermas has replaced his quasi-transcendentalist normative justification with a much more
historicized and immanent critique o f bourgeois democracy, which means that the
specialized discourse o f morality, proceeding in terms regulated by the ideal speech situation,
has been replaced by the everyday and unspecialized democratic public sphere. But the
underlying objective o f Habermas’ work, however, has still been to justify universal norms.
The privileged object o f discourse in the public sphere for Habermas is the political system.
His legalistic conception o f morality, with which Benhabib took issue, has ultimately only
been replaced by an overriding concern with law. His continuing emphasis then remains on
conceptualizing legitimacy through the free and uncoerced discourse o f relevant participants
about the relatively impersonal order regulating those participants’ conduct within a system
of articulated individual rights.
Benhabib, in her latest work, has given up the more immediate call for an
“anticipatory-utopian critique o f the present” that motivated Critique, Norm, and Utopia.
Friendship, love, and a more radically individualist posture are not the main focus o f her
concerns here. Benhabib’s emphasis remains on open discourse and normative interactions
unrestricted by impersonal systems. She seems to emphasize that the discourse itself should
have a binding character on democratic participants; law is a second-rate solution to
voluntary compliance. The privileged object o f appeal o f democratic associations, then, is
not the political system but civil society itself. Is this emphasis, though, in her political
program any more viable than her seeming previous call for universal human tenderness?
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Habermas himself has taken up the issue o f utopia m ore directly.25 The issue here for
him is the exhaustion o f utopian energies and their potential renewal. Traditionally, argues
Habermas, the notion of utopia has been based on that o f social labor. But this conception
has exhausted itself in the monetarization and bureacratization o f the welfare state.
Opposed to these two mediums o f steering Habermas juxtaposes that o f solidarity.
Habermas identifies three arenas: that o f political elites, preestablished and propertied
groups, and
a third arena in which subde communication flows determine the form o f political culture
and, with the help o f definitions o f reality, com pete for what Gramsci called cultural
hegemony; this is where shifts in the trend o f the Zeitgeist take place. The interaction o f
among these arenas is not easily grasped. U p to now processes in the middle arena seem to
have had priority. Wherever the empirical answer turns out to be, our practicalproblem can in
any case be seen m ore readily now. any project that wants to shift the balance in favor o f
regulation through solidarity has to m obilize the lower arena against the tw o upper ones.26

Habermas himself certainly seems much closer to Benhabib now. The trouble starts when
Habermas does develop something o f an ‘empirical answer,’ which perhaps blunts the more
radical democratic thrust apparent here.

25 Jurgen Habermas, ed. Steven Seidman. “The Crisis o f the Welfare and the Exhaustion o f Utopian
Energies,” Jurgen Habermas on Politics and Society: A Reader, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989)

Section Two
DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
So far my purpose has been to articulate a development within the communicative
turn in critical theory between two largely sympathetic thinkers. I would like to turn now
more explicidy to criticism o f deliberative democracy. In the first sub-section I will deal with
two o f the major traditional criticisms against deliberative democracy identified by Seyla
Benhabib. In identifying the particular responses Seyla Benhabib makes to these criticisms, I
will argue that what they have in common, according to deliberative democracy, is a
misunderstanding o f the institutional trajectory o f deliberative democracy, and that the
criticisms can be blunted by a more adequate characterization o f the institutionalization in
deliberative democracy o f the norms elucidated by discourse ethics.
Before proceeding, however, it is important to reiterate what the general principles
of deliberative democracy derived from discourse ethics are, since it is precisely in light of
such principles that questions o f deliberative institutions must be arbitrated.
The basic idea behind this model is that only those norms (i.e. general rules o f action and
institutional arrangements) can be said to be valid (i.e. morally binding), which would be
agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if such agreement were reached as
a consequence o f a process o f deliberation that had the following features: 1)
participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms o f equality and symmetry; all
have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open
debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics o f conversation; and 3) all
have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules o f the discourse
procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.27

I will argue that in meeting these objections from the broader tradition o f AngloAmerican democratic political theory, both Habermas and Benhabib emphasize the
compatibility o f deliberative democracy with existing political institutions, but that such an

26 Ibid., p. 297
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emphasis risks generating an internal tension between the strong conception o f free and
equal participation generated by discourse ethics and its own institutional account.
Habermas will be the subject o f the first sub-section, Benhabib o f the second. In the third
sub-subsection I will consider Nancy Fraser’s own work on mediating the recognitive and
redistributive paradigms o f justice, and contrast it with Benhabib’s own account, before
concluding in sub-section four with my own recommendations.

The democratic opponents of deliberative democracy for Benhabib come from three
major camps: 28
*

First, liberal theorists will express concern that such a strong m odel w ould lead to the
corrosion o f individual liberties and may in fact destabilize the rule o f l a w . . . institutionalists
and realists consider this discourse m odel hopelessly naive, maybe even dangerous, its
seeming plebiscitary and anti-institutional implications.29

These camps raise questions about the institutional implications o f deliberative democracy,
which is considered to be either intrusive or anarchically utopian. The liberal worry
expresses a long-standing concern in political theory over the potential tyranny of democracy
and the whim o f majoritarian decisions. The rule o f the majority risks the transformation o f
a stable rule o f law into passing fancies and the persecution o f minorities in the majoritarian
interest By contrast, the liberal emphasis on individual rights is intended to protect
individuals and preserve the freedoms o f citizens. Democracy for the liberal must proceed
from this bedrock.
The institutional realist extends this critique, arguing that deliberative democracy
risks not only democratic tyranny but anarchy. Such a strong normative conception would

27 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model o f Democratic Legitimacy,” Democracy and Difference:
Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 70
28 The third major camp for Benhabib is the feminist charge that the universalist and rationalist public
sphere which is the province o f white males excludes alternative modes o f “situated” discourse such as
storytelling and greeting, and therefore marginalizes women and other minorities. Many o f the subsequent
points are sympathetic to this position, but I leave the issue aside for another time.
29 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model o f Democratic Legitimacy,”, p. 74

22

rule out any o f the prevailing democratic institutions and normatively undermine them,
without being able to propose an alternative that could meet the demands o f modem,
complex societies. One is left, in other words, with an abstract rejection o f existing
democratic institutions based on an unrealizable utopian longing for a universal town hall.

Habermas himself has repeatedly warned against taking discourse theoretic principles
too literally as a model for their institutionalization in deliberative democracy. The model is
not one o f consensus-based decision making among a small, assembled group, as one might
assume from the ideal speech situation. But the ideal speech situation for Habermas itself
was never meant to be taken too literally as a schema by which to organize deliberations but
rather as a regulative ideal against which proposed norms could be measured and criticized.
The model for deliberative democracy then is not that o f a free-for-all in a sort o f mass
assembly. Far from endorsing a classical model o f the forum in contrast to the complexity
o f modern societies, Habermas argues that only the procedural model is adequate to the task
o f legitimating democracy in such complex, differentiated societies in which the ruled and
rulers can be neither immediately identified nor strictly separated. So perhaps then the best
means by which to retort to the previously outlined criticism o f deliberative democracy in
this introduction would be to return to Habermas’ elaboration o f the relation o f public to
private autonomy as he sets it out in the tradition o f m odem democratic political theory.
But Habermas’ account, I argue in turn, while responding to his critics opens up tensions
with his own normative commitments.

23

2.1 Democratic D eficits in Habermas
\

The role o f the democratic process in liberal and republican conceptions differs
markedly. For the liberal conception, the state is considered subordinate to a civil society for
which it serves the function o f mediating private interests through a neutral public

,

Administration. For the republican, the state is a higher, reflective form o f substantive
ethical life through which solidarity and political communication, uncoupled from the ,
economy, serve as the primary forms o f societal integration and steering. This for Habermas
has consequences in terms o f how each conceives o f the role o f the citizen, the law, and
finally the political process.
The citizen for the liberal is primarily a private person whose “individual rights are
negative rights that guarantee a domain o f freedom o f choice within which legal persons are
freed from external coercion.”30 The rights o f the republican citizen by contrast are positive
rights to participate in a common practice o f self-definition. “The state’s raison d’itre does
not lie primarily in the protection o f equal individual fig h tsb u tin the guarantee o f an
mclusmTprocesffof15pimon-'Md’^^T orm attoli'm which freellnd equal citizens reach an
understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interest o f all.”31 In terms o f the
legal order, while for the liberal individual rights are prior to discursive will formation, for
the republican such rights owe their existence to such discourse. For Habermas, “the
republican conception at least points in the direction o f a concept o f law that accords equal
weight to both the integrity o f the individual and the integrity o f the community in which
persons as both individuals and members can first accord one another reciprocal

30 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 241
31 Ibid.
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recognition.”32 Finally, while for the liberal the political process is conceived in primarily
strategic terms in the competition for administrative power, for the republican the logic of
the political process is governed by “the obstinate structures o f a public communication
oriented to mutual understanding.”33 While these positions are ones Habermas is ascribing
to the republican conception, it is language elsewhere, perhaps verbatim, that he often uses
to articulate his own position.
The emphasis on public communication, however, for Habermas does no t come at
the expense o f individual rights. The liberal criticism o f deliberative democracy then
confuses deliberative democracy strictly with a republican or agonistic scheme. Habermas
though argues for the co-originary status o f public and private autonomy. A fair public
dialogue among free and equal participants requires the integrity o f those individual
participants, and thus an institutionalization o f deliberative democratic principles requires a
system o f individual rights. Rights conceived by deliberative democracy, furthermore, are
more tightly integrated with the democratic polity than under a liberal notion. Rather than
being the result o f some pre-established fact as per liberalism, rights are not only the
condition o f democratic discourse but through the interpretation in deliberative procedures
take a more articulate form, become reaffirmed by the polity, and gain further democratic
legitimation.
Still, some confusion on the part o f liberal critics may have been generated in part by
the fact that Habermas seems to side tentatively more with the republican than liberal
conceptions at a normative level. W hat is unclear is whether Habermas is ascribing to the
republican conception an understanding o f the interdependence o f public and private
autonomy he denies to it elsewhere or whether —contrary to Habermas’ expressed

32 Ibid., p. 242
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intentions —there is implicit in his own theory a certain priority o f public autonomy,
stemming from his earlier work in discourse ethics. Whatever privilege Habermas gives to
individual rights is primarily a matter o f exercising these rights not in civil society but in the
political sphere. While rights in the civil sphere above and beyond those needed to
participate as free and equal individuals in the public sphere may be legitimated by public
discourse, they have only a derivative and not co-originary status. In a certain sense it is
private political autonomy.
Habermas still attempts to distinguish himself from the republican conception. “It
makes the democratic process dependent on the virtues o f citizens devoted to the public
w eal For politics is not concerned in the first place with questions o f ethical selfunderstanding. The mistake o f the republican view consists in an ethical foreshortening of
political discourse.”34 A t the same time, while not submitting all political discourse to this
conception, on basic questions o f political discourse, not to mention the legitimation o f the
democratic process itself, Habermas seems to side on these normative fundamentals squarely
in the republican camp with their priority on public autonomy.

The issue that Habermas does take with the republican conception’s ethical burden,
however, becomes one o f the primary determinants for his model o f what institutional form
democracy must take.
Under conditions o f cultural and social pluralism, behind relevant goals there often lie
interests and value-orientations that are by n o means constitutive o f the identity o f the
political community as a whole, that is, for the totality o f an intersubjectively shared form o f
life. These interests and value-orientations, which conflict with one another within the same
polity without any prospect o f consensual resolution, need to be counterbalanced in a way
that cannot be effected by ethical discourse, even though the results o f this nondiscursive
counterbalancing are subject to the proviso that they m ust not violate the basic values o f a

33 Ibid., p. 243
34 Ibid., p. 244
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culture. T he balancing o f interests takes the form o f reaching a compromise between parties
w ho rely on their power and ability to sanction.35

Certainly Habermas here is no anti-institutionalist. In fact, he criticizes the republican
conception for a certain political naivete, particularly under modem conditions o f pluralism.
The fact o f pluralism is m ost certainly something that any contemporary political philosophy
must confront, lest it backslide into wistful and ultimately irrelevant pining for ethical
homogeneity. The single, reflexive institution o f the state o f a singular ethical life in the
republican conception on the deliberative model is replaced by a plurality o f modes of
association.

W hat seems surprising though, given the basic normative commitments he
previously outlined, is how suddenly and completely, beyond the civil public sphere,
Habermas accepts the basic liberal institutional structure o f bureaucratic administration,
elections, and a market economy as the only possible institutional means with which to
confront the fact o f pluralism democratically. “The sole presupposition is a public
administration o f the kind that emerged in the early modem period together with the
European state system and in functional interconnection with a capitalist economic
system.”36 The ethical foreshortening o f political discourse by the republican conception
leads for Habermas to a liberal foreshortening o f political discourse about basic institutional
arrangements for a democratic society, for in attempting to accommodate an ethical
pluralism that republicanism cannot tolerate, Habermas is led into assuming a liberal
institutional structure that may not in turn be able to accommodate the vibrant individual
political participation o f a republicanism he attempts to sublate into his own conception of
deliberative democracy . Can such an arrangement really preserve the “radical democratic

35 Ibid., pp. 244-5
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m e a n in g

o f a society that organizes itself through the communicatively united citizens” that

Habermas endorses?

Habermas attempts to mediate his commitments to popular sovereignty and liberal
institutions by adding to the liberal scheme a civil public sphere that through various
channels and sluices influences the public debate within the political sphere outside o f the
election cycle. The direct participation o f the republican model is replaced by various levels
in the public sphere which ‘filter’ participation in discursive opinion and will formation.
It is through the interlocking set o f these multiple forms o f associations, networks, and
organizations that an anonymous “public conversation” results. It is central to the m odel o f
deliberative democracy that it privileges such a public sphere o f interlocking and overlapping
networks and associations o f deliberation, contestation, and argumentation. T he fiction o f a
general deliberative assembly in which the united people expressed their will belongs to the
early history o f democratic theory; today our guiding m odel has to be that o f a medium o f
loosely associated, multiple foci o f opinion formation and dissemination, which affect one
another in free and spontaneous processes o f communication.37

It is in view o f the public sphere and its indirect influence on political debate that the
addressees o f the law are meant to see themselves at the same time as participating in its
legislation. The public sphere’s sluices are also meant to be the means by which money and
administrative power are balanced by solidarity as forms o f social steering.
It is highly questionable, however, to what extent Habermas’ schema can be
considered an adequate balance, and thus to what extent public autonomy as a conception o f
free and equal participants in legislation can be done justice to, under such a schema. In such
a conception, solidarity is by no means an equal partner to money and power. While the
latter two act directly on civil society, solidarity through the public sphere only pressures the
political debate concerning the use o f administrative sanction, and thus acts only indirectly.

36 Ibid., pp. 246-7
j7 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative M odel o f Dem ocratic Legitim acy,” pp. 73-74
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Only the political system can ‘a c t’ It is a subsystem specialized for collectively binding
decisions, whereas the communicative structures o f the public sphere comprise a far-flung
network o f sensors that respond to the pressure o f society-wide problems and stimulate
influential opinions. The public opinion which is worked up via democratic procedures
cannot itself ‘rule’ but can only channel the use o f administrative power in certain
directions.38

Even if this is true, Habermas hardly argues that this is a limit to society as such rather than
an historical limitation o f our present institutional arrangements. Is the relative muscle of
the political subsystem a feature o f politics as such, or rather a feature o f bureaucratized
political subsystems operating in conjunction with a privatized civil sphere and market
economy?
While considering the indirect influence of solidarity on the administrative use o f
power and thus solidarity’s indirect influence on economic power, Habermas fails to
thematize the influence o f administrative power and money on the processes o f discursive
will formation and, in particular, to what extent sluices are undergirded or steered by the very
uses o f administrative and economic power they are supposed to counterbalance.
Furthermore, while considering the relation o f political discourse to a widely dispersed,
organized, and energized public in terms o f sluices and channels o f influence, Habermas fails
to adequately consider the filters and sluices through which topics o f debate enter the
influential level o f political discourse. The influence o f money and power on these filters is
especially pernicious precisely because it is far less likely to be seen as an exercise o f money
or power since the concerns are less articulated and the debate less visible. The more
subterranean the level o f discourse the more difficult it is for the procedures o f discourse
themselves to become articulated and receive a public airing. The exclusion o f marginalized
individuals or groups by contrast is at the same time an exclusion of their claims ofexclusion.

38 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 250
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The issue then is not simply that with money or power a Rupert Murdoch has a
competitive advantage to set the agenda o f public policy (not even direct participation could
as it were give everyone their ‘fifteen minutes’); rather it is the degree to which social
marginalisation denies a full and fair hearing to claims about the rules and procedures by
which the public and political discourse proceeds, considerations among which would surely
be the influence o f money and power in setting the political agenda. If one cannot receive
due consideration of their claim to be excluded from public discourse because o f his or her
marginalised social position, then this is a violation o f public autonomy because it is a
procedural exclusion. Such an individual is no t simply losing a batde in the war o f ideas but
is excluded from the full exercise o f his or her public autonomy in the basic normative
political discourse about constitutional fundamentals, including discourse about the very
exercise o f public autonomy.39 Since the “private autonomy o f equally entided citizens can
be secured only insofar as citizens actively exercise their civic autonomy,” such individuals’
private autonomy also cannot be guaranteed.
Certainly Habermas is no simple apologist for the status quo as his theory certainly
emphasizes the participation o f those that the status quo largely excludes. What is unclear is
what institutional means Habermas has to respond to these sorts o f objections. O f
particular concern may be the exclusion not just o f participation as such but the operations
o f power on the logic o f the criteria by which discourses are settied and the ‘force o f the
better argument’ decided. With Foucault one might wonder whether even within a
“panoptical” society, the conditions o f an ideal speech situation might no t be fulfilled, and
whether Habermas ultimately has adequately addressed the potential for systematic
discursive distortions within the public sphere.

39 These concerns are only amplified for those social actors whose potential claims have yet to be articulated in
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For Habermas, at either a normative or institutional level, public and private
autonomy presuppose one another. Similarly, both republicanism and liberalism prove
inadequate as a foundation for both democratic theory and practice in so far as each
privileges one pole o f the relation at the expense o f the other. Habermas’ theory, however,
is less smoothly integrated than Habermas himself pictures it, especially when his attempt to
integrate public and private autonomy at the normative and theoretical level proceeds to the
institutional level. While claiming a co-originary status for both public and private
autonomy, the strong and emphatic normative characterization Habermas wants to give the
deliberative democracy model (stemming from discourse ethics) emphasizes public
autonomy in his normative foundations, giving this theoretical level a certain republican cast.
In responding to liberal and realist concerns, at the level o f articulating appropriate
democratic institutions, by contrast, Habermas largely follows a liberal model. This is a
tension that Habermas’ account o f the public sphere and its sluices o f solidaristic power
does not resolve, and rather than sublating the republican and liberal moments Habermas is
left splitting the difference. While attempting to bridge this tension in the institutionalization
o f solidarity through the public sphere and its sluices, Habermas’ own undertheorization of
the relation between forms o f social power leaves his conception in danger o f becoming a
democratically normative gloss on the prevailing institutionalization o f private autonomy,
and thus by Habermas’ own standard o f interdependence, an inadequate conception o f
private autonomy as well. The account o f deliberative democracy then, even in terms o f its
own normative, ‘radical democratic’ ambitions, floats somewhere between an anemic
republicanism and only slighdy more robust liberalism.

even a subterranean level o f the public sphere.
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, 2.2 Democratic Deficits in Benhabib

Although she took the communicative turn in critical theory, with Habermas, Seyla
Benhabib was highly critical o f his neo-Kantian formulation o f discourse ethics. She has
become significantly less critical o f Habermas after having followed him in the turn to
I

deliberative democracy. Foremost for both thinkers has been a defense o f practical
rationality in the public realm stemming from principles derived from discourse ethics. “The
approach I follow is consonant with what John Rawls has called ‘Kantian constructivism’
and what Jurgen Habermas refers to as ‘reconstruction.’ In .this context, the differences in
methodology are less significant than their shared assumptions that the institutions o f liberal
democracies embody the idealized content o f a form o f practical reason.”40 Contra Rawls
but with Habermas she characterizes this form o f practical reasons in terms o f a civil public
t

' sphere.
I•

---------

Such processes have a claim to rationality because they increase and make available necessary
information, because they allow the expression of arguments in light o f which opinions and
beliefs need to be revised, and because they lead to the formulation o f conclusions that can
~be~challenged publicly tor good reasons . : . TEFcKief lnsfimtibnifcorrekte^bf^sucEamodelo f deliberative dem ocracy is a m ultiple, anonym ous, heterogeneous netw ork o f many publics
and private conversations.41

As I have argued previously, however, there are good reasons to believe that Habermas has
failed in his articulation o f the public sphere as a means to do justice to those discourse
theoretic normative principles in complex, modem societies. Does Benhabib’s reformulated
orientation in discourse ethics then blunt the criticisms elucidated above against Habermas,
since those criticisms took aim primarily at the Kantian orientation o f his work?

40 Seyla Benhabib. “Toward a Deliberative Model o f Democratic Legitimacy,” p. 68
41 Ibid., p. 87
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While continuing to operate in the paradigm o f communicative ethics, Benhabib’s
version has had a different orientation from the start. Benhabib rejected Habermas’ neoKantian transcendental justification o f discourse ethics on self-consciously Hegelian
grounds. This had the further consequence o f rejecting Habermas’ strict distinction between
moral and ethical discourses, which led Benhabib to posit a complementary sphere o f
solidarity and needs to that o f rights. In Benhabib’s move to deliberative democracy, while
the shared assumption o f practical reason with figures like Rawls and Habermas takes on an
increasingly Kantian character, its grounding remains Hegelian.
This form o f practical reason has becom e the collective and anonymous property o f
cultures, institutions, and traditions as the result o f the experiments and experiences, both
ancient and m odem , with democratic rule over the course o f human history. . . W hen one
thinks through the form o f practical rationality at the core o f democratic rule, H egel’s
concept o f ‘objective Spirit’ (objektiver Geisl) appears to m e particularly appropriate . . .
without [the] metaphor o f the subject implicitly governing it, the term ‘objective spirit’ would
refer to those anonymousy e t intelligible collective rules, procedures, and practices that form a
way o f life.42

While Habermas himself has largely abandoned in deliberative democracy the project o f
transcendentalist justifications in favor o f an appeal to the historically situated requirements
of a post-metaphysical modernity, a Kantian legacy still tuns strongly through much o f his
work: the differentiation o f value spheres, a legal focus, and a statist orientation. These
orientations, I have argued previously, contribute significantly to the tensions in Habermas’
conception o f deliberative democracy. While abandoning the supersubject o f Hegel and its
instantiation in the state as the highest form o f ethical life, Benhabib has maintained, in her
move to deliberative democracy, an interest in the dialectic between justice and ethical self
definition, and an interest in a robust (though no t homogenous) ethical life as a feature o f
public life and political deliberation.

42 Ibid., p. 69
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The most concrete difference between Habermas and Benhabib in terms o f
deliberative democracy has been over what the proper object o f public sphere deliberation is.
For Rawls the public sphere is located within the m odem state. While the public sphere for
Habermas is civil, its object primarily is the legislative bodies that control the bureaucratic
administrative apparatuses o f the m odem state. For Benhabib, much o f the work o f the civil
public sphere is on civil society itself. “Opinion-making publics, as found in social
movements, for example, can lead us to reconsider and rethink very controversial issues
about privacy, sexuality, and intimacy, but this does no t imply that the only or even most
desirable consequence o f such processes o f public deliberation should be general
legislation.”43 Two other significant consequences then follow in the organization o f the
public sphere. First, while Habermas has emphasized a multivocal, layered public sphere,
Benhabib, in her more elaborate work on feminism, multiculturalism, and the politics o f
difference, has characterized some o f these associations, following Nancy Fraser, as ‘sub
altern counterpublics’: spaces for minorities to articulate and argue over the distinction
between public and private, the state and the public sphere, and layers in the public sphere
itself. Second, Benhabib has taken a more decided interest in alternative institutional
organization “to question seriously and investigate the institutionalpossibilities o f realizing a
democracy centered on a procedure o f free, public deliberation.”44
Habermas’ entire political project is still rooted in the Kantian problematic o f
attempting to mediate the addressers and addressees o f modem law. This stems from the
assumption that in modern, complex societies the givers and receivers o f law are removed in
the first instance, since the political system is differentiated from civil society and the
organization o f society is assumed to proceed primarily from the political apparatus. While

43 Ibid, p. 84
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not agreeing with Marx that a true democracy entails abolishing the state, Benhabib does de
center the state as an apparatus o f social steering, and elevates democratic discourse. The
civil public sphere under this conception gains a certain relative autonomy; the norms
garnered by political discourse have their own binding effect without mediation from the
state. Even without its emphasis on the state with a higher-order reflective life, Benhabib
comes closer to a republican conception o f a self-regulating sphere o f political autonomy.
Habermas, in endorsing parliamentary politics and emphasizing the role o f the state
as a subsystem which ‘acts,’ also structurally privileges those areas o f the public sphere from
which the sluices that affect the political system emanate. Since the object o f public
autonomy primarily concerns that o f the state, it also primarily concerns those regions o f the
public sphere that have influence in deliberations within the state. The consequence is a
conception o f public autonomy that moves steadily upwards from everyday informal
conversations to increasingly higher levels o f organization aimed at public policy. In
essence, Habermas, in setting up the problematic o f modem sovereignty in terms o f those
who make the law and those who receive it, fails in the addition o f his conception o f a civil
public sphere to articulate a real community of free and equal participants. Vast segments o f
the population do not exercise their political autonomy any more robustly than they would
in a liberal electoral system, which is in no small part why Benhabib takes issue with
Habermas’ account.
Benhabib de-centers the state as an essential mediator o f social power. W hen the
issue is reformulated then not as an issue o f law but o f prevailing norms, the tension is
formulated not just between a legal system and a populace but between a civil public sphere
and a civil society. The distance between the addressers and addressees o f social norms is

44 Ibid., p. 85

35

significantly reduced. The idea that we are at once makers and subjects o f the ‘law’ gains
increasing plausibility to the extent that it is the effect o f free and equal discourse rather than
the product o f filtered discourses upon a system with its own internal logic, though capable
o f permeation by democratic discourses.
So while Habermas endorses a differentiated public sphere, the movement in a sense
always extends upwards. Simultaneously, however, the reflexive moment in discourse ethics
is institutionalized upwards, and so thus, at the level where it matters and at which public
autonomy is actually exercised, the capability to enter into second-order dialogue about the
rules o f procedure and claims o f exclusion is adjudicated at higher-order levels o f the public
sphere. Tongue-in cheek, this can be referred to as the ‘David Horowitz effect’, in which
only those positions already backed by money and power are able to make the claim o f
exclusion in an ‘official’ discourse.45 The risk then is an exclusion o f claims o f exclusion by
those members o f the democratic polity who are, in fact, lacking the recognition o f moneyed
and powered interests.
It is to address such problems that Benhabib endorses the notion o f a
heterogeneous, dispersed network o f ‘sub-altem counter-publics.’
Subaltern Counterpublic Theory . . . proposes that marginalized groups, including Hispanics,
are restricted in the general Public by dominant structures in academic and political
institutions. The best means o f combating this restriction is the development o f
Counterpublics, spaces in which the marginalized groups becom es the homogenous
majority. Within these Counterpublics, the marginalized group is able to introduce,
deliberate, circulate, and perfect thoughts, actions and strategies, without the restrictions or
limitations im posed by dominant structures. T hese n ew thoughts and actions might then be
brought to the larger Public for further circulation and deliberation.46

45 David Horowitz is a conservative pundit whose organization focuses on highlighting alleged liberal
biases in the media and academia. His various political stunts only filter through the public sphere on
account o f a well-financed organization with powerful connections in the media and politics, thus making
his claims o f muzzling and censorship at the very least, deeply ironic.
46 Miguel Figueroa & Annabelle Nunez. (2003, April). Materials, Models and Margins: On the
Vicissitudes o f Archiving Identity and Community, Presentation at the Sixth Institute o f the Trejo Foster
Foundation for Hispanic Library Education, Los Angeles CA.
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Counter-publics, operating in the broader civil public sphere, follow the logic o f an
oppositional party at the parliamentary level, increasing the rationality o f public discourse by
raising the level o f general information and countering generally popular assumptions with
public arguments.

The particular importance o f ‘sub-altem’ public spheres, as contrasted

from other civil associations, is to provide an arena to highlight and contest the
public/private distinction. For Habermas, solidarity coagulates at those levels o f the public
sphere emphasizing general legislation, as do the steering mechanisms o f money and power.
Benhabib instead emphasizes the importance o f counter-publics negotiating the intricacies
o f such issues. Such counter-publics, operating as a counterweight, become the bases o f
operations from which claims o f exclusion from the general public sphere can be made,
which would otherwise be adjudicated on the terms o f the dominan t public discourse.
If Habermas, perhaps even against his own best intentions, becomes a conservative
in terms o f democratic civil institutions in the public sphere, it is because he thinks that in
complex, m odem societies bureaucratic public administrations and market capitalism are
givens. Because solidarity ‘acts’ only through public administration, the internal organization
o f associations in the public sphere becomes dominated by their attempt to influence
bureaucratic public policy, by either lobbying the state more directly or by the ability to
create a popular sense o f crisis among the citizenry. For Benhabib, it is precisely when the
uninstitutionalized everyday discourses and the norms emanating from them become the
object o f political action that the effect o f such discourses becomes more nebulous and
immeasurable, if only because the consequences are less intended as instrumental effects
than as mutual understandings.
Freed from the singular political objective o f influencing bureaucratic public policy,
associations in the public sphere are now given the opportunity to extend the participation
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o f citizens generally excluded from political discourse. The deliberative democratic ideal o f
self-governance is increasingly made possible by the communicative progress o f institutional
design. Benhabib attempts to open the door to a real balance o f solidarity as a social steering
mechanism with bureaucratic administration and money in two ways: first by opening the
doors to participation in the broader normative governance o f society by associations not
directly mediated by the state, and, second, by opening participation in such institutions to
broader segments o f society, aided in due part by the demand o f inclusion by ‘sub-altem
counter-publics.’

In terms o f a more self-regulating public sphere and an emphasis on sub-altem
counter-publics, Benhabib has worked to alleviate some o f the democratic deficits in
Habermas’ conception. Her work has continued to extend the deliberative principle beyond
the limits posited by Habermas, in turn making those limits into more fluid boundaries. She
has extended discourse ethics from rights to questions o f solidarity, from morality to
questions o f ethics, and finally from law to forms o f non-legal social steering. Her focus on
the public sphere and the institutions within it, however, may not be enough to realize ‘the
radical meaning o f democracy’ that deliberative democracy espouses, given a remaining
conservative trajectory concerning the relation o f the public sphere to social sub-systems
outside it. So while Benhabib’s model o f a civil public sphere is broader and more
participatory than Habermas’, and may thus serve to strengthen solidarity as a form o f social
steering, her relative lack o f attention to the mediations o f the civil public sphere by other
steering mechanisms such as money and power may undermine her attempt to provide a
more robust model o f democracy. That is to say, money and power invariably introduce
elements o f coercion even into a more vigorous or inclusive public sphere.
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For Habermas the virtue o f the republican conception was its emphasis on “the
obstinate structures o f a public communication oriented to mutual understanding.”4' A t the
same

tim e

it places too much o f a burden on the public weal o f citizens and contracts

political discourse to ethics.
Under conditions o f cultural and social pluralism, behind politically relevant goals there are
often interests and value-orientations that are by n o means constitutive o f the identity o f the
political community as a w hole, that is, for the totality o f an intersubjectively shared form o f
life. These interests and value-orientations, which conflict with one another within the same
polity without any prospect o f consensual resolution, need to be counterbalanced in a way
that cannot be effected by ethical discourse . . . the balancing o f interests takes the form o f
reaching a compromise between parties w ho rely on their power and ability to sanction.4*

Although she abandons the homogenous ethical life o f the republican conception, has
Benhabib, in elevating such discourses to bring solidarity more in balance with money and
power, placed too much of an unrealistic communicative burden on actors in the public
sphere, especially under conditions o f value pluralism? Benhabib has in some sense taken
discourses about needs and identity that occur in the republican conception o f the state and
added them to the civil public sphere. This is not to remove ethical discourse from the
political sphere nor is it to contract political discourses and the inevitable compromises
issuing from governing a society o f diverse values and interests. For Benhabib, rather, what
constitutes a legislative issue, and what burden o f political participation is placed on the
citizenry, should be decided through deliberations ranging from the civil public sphere to the
state. Habermas, by contrast, foreshortens just these kinds o f discourses by positing the
state simply as the privileged object o f the public sphere. The limits o f a republican
conception under conditions o f cultural and social pluralism for Habermas are to be
transcended by a deliberative proceduralism. Because, however, the object o f political

47 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 243
48 Ibid., pp. 244-5
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discourse is the state for Habermas, this proceduralism winds up tending towards forms o f
liberal, “neutral” compromise that solidify the public/private distinction.
Sub-altem counter-publics have a certain privileged place in Benhabib’s scheme in
drawing the public/private distinction, further institutionalizing the reflexive commitments
o f deliberative democracy in opening democratic procedures to further discussion and
rearticulation. Benhabib’s answer to cultural and value pluralism is not then to emphasize
deliberatively fair, liberal compromises, but further ethical reflexivity. In contrast to
traditional republicanism, Benhabib’s model emphasizes contestation and rearticulation
rather than articulation and affirmation. Sub-altem counter-publics give a place to minority
voices and potential claims o f exclusion that might otherwise be silenced in Habermas’ more
general and legally oriented public sphere. The rejection o f a univocal public sphere in
deliberative democracy, however, while answering the charges o f naive utopianism, opens up
the problem o f a “ free and equal” communication between these varying networks.
While the broader public must be complemented by counter-publics in order to be
more truly representative, counter-publics in turn m ust be complemented by the broader
public in order to be effective. In so Hr as the ethical self-definitions occurring in such
spheres are to become universalizable justice concerns, they need the recognition o f the
public sphere. This recognition in late capitalist societies does not proceed by recognition o f
the better argument alone. Better placed, organized, and financed groups in the public
sphere with access to molding the operations o f bureaucratic power have a good deal o f
ability to define who their opposition is. A difficulty detected in Habermas then reappears,
in that claims o f exclusion from unrecognized counter-publics are potentially excluded.
Oppositional groups improve the rationality o f deliberative processes by improving
information flows and opening arguments to dispute. Such processes may be less than
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ideally rational, however, by still limiting deliberation to dominant, albeit competitive,
parties. W hat needs to be interrogated is not only the relation o f counter-publics to the state
and broader regions o f the public sphere but also tbeir relation to unformalized, everyday
interactions and conversations. How then do conversations become associations? This is a
particularly important question because even while the public sphere as an institution carries
the normative weight for deliberative theorists, it is precisely these informal everyday
interactions that for deliberative democratic theorists give the public sphere its normative
weight, for they best capture the open-ended, participatory dialogues among unprivileged
parties envisioned by discourse ethics. The associations emanating from these conversations
represent the power o f solidarity as a form o f social steering.
How effectively solidarity is channeled is in one respect a matter o f institutional
design, and Benhabib has been open to such questions in order to strengthen solidarity as a
form o f social steering. W hat Benhabib rejects, however, is the attempt to formalize, or
otherwise institutionalize, those everyday conversations that are the root o f democracy. O n
the one hand, such an attempt would be simply unworkable. O n the other hand, such a
formalization would begin to erode just those features o f everyday conversation oriented to
mutual understanding that align themselves so closely with discourse ethics. The danger
though becomes a certain idealization o f informal discourse on the part o f deliberative
democracy in failing to realize the extent to which such conversations are already structured
by social steering mechanisms like power and money —for example, in the demarcation of
public and private zones o f social intercourse, urban infrastructures, and the organization of
work. Benhabib at one point asks explicitly a question that has been impliddy guiding much
o f this interrogation o f deliberative democracy.
Since its inception with the Greeks the question o f the m ost adequate socioeconom ic order
m ost compatible with democratic rule has been intensely debated. Rousseau’s ow n wisdom
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on the matter was that only in a society in which n o one was poor enough to have to sell
him self and no one rich enough to buy another could be democratic. Since the nineteenth
century, the question o f the compatibility between democracy and capitalism has been on
the agenda. For this reason the relationship between deliberative democracy and social
complexity needs to be posed otherwise: what are the forms o f association and m odes o f
organization, at the econom ic, social, cultural spheres, that bear an ‘elective affinity’ with the
principles o f deliberative democracy at the political sphere?49

Benhabib’s less-than-adequate answer, after articulating some general theoretical
considerations, is to privilege new institutional possibilities in the design o f civil, political
institutions, and she singles out environmental groups, “in which the practice o f discursive
design enable efficiency and success through voluntary compliance, consciousness raising,
and decentralized problem solving.”50 Such institutional considerations begin to address
Habermas’ concern that civil public associations are not up to the task o f social steering
without state intervention. Moreover, the question o f adequate economic, social, and
cultural institutions must be dealt with in a democratic manner. An account o f adequately
democratic political institutions, then, would be conceptually prior, since such institutions
would legitimate the norms by which economic, social, and cultural institutions would be
judged. Along with Habermas, however, what Benhabib fails to address here, is that
achieving an adequate balance o f solidarity, money, and power in complex societies is not
just a question of augmenting solidaristic institutions so that they can function as
mechanisms o f social steering and thus help regulate the influences o f money and power, but
also a question o f the influence o f money and power in the formation o f common concerns
and political associations in the public sphere.

Similarly, the emphasis on environmental groups highlights the internal organization
o f such associations and their impact on society without interrogating either the influence o f

49 Ibid., p. 85
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society on such organizations or how the democratic and unorganized wellspring o f
conversations oriented to mutual understanding work their way up into such organizations.
The general social composition o f environmental groups, for instance, is well known and
reflects the disparities in ‘assodational capital’ o f civil society more largely. The question o f
adequate socioeconomic arrangements might well be a question that can only be answered
democratically, but it is also one whose democratic legitimacy depends on it being an inclusive
deliberation amongfree and equalparticipants. This legitimacy is at risk to the extent to which
assodational capital is dependent on cultural and economic capital. So then, while
Habermas, in taking the existing institutionalization o f money and power for granted, is
unable to articulate a public sphere able to do justice to his normative commitments, it is
unclear whether Benhabib in articulating a more robust civil public sphere more consonant
with the prindples o f deliberative democracy still fails to adequately relate such a conception
to the mediations o f social subsystems. Benhabib’s m ost explicit treatment to date o f the
question o f the relation o f deliberative democracy to economic considerations occurs in the
context of The Claims of Culture, particularly in the context o f the political and philosophical
debate over recognitive and redistributive paradigms o f justice. Benhabib self-consciously
owes her own formulation o f the problematic to Nancy Fraser. The framework that she
adopts from Fraser in order to accommodate economic concerns, I will argue in the next
sub-section, ultimately belies her own deliberative democratic framework.

50 Ibid., p. 87
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2.3 Fraser and Benhabib on Recognition and Redistribution
t

Fraser sets up her interrogation in the historical context o f what she terms the
“postsocialist condition.”
The ‘postsocialist condition’ concerns a shift in the grammar o f political claims-making.
1
Claims for the recognition of group difference have become increasingly salient in the recent
period, at times eclipsing claims for social equality. Ib is phenomenon can be observed at
two levels. Empirically, o f course, we have seen the rise of ‘identity politics,’ the decentering
o f class, and, until very recently, the corresponding decline o f social democracy. More
deeply, however, we are witnessing an apparent shift in the political imaginary, especially in
the way in which justice is imagined . . . The result is a decoupling o f cultural politics from
social politics and the relative eclipse o f the latter by the former.51

Fraser’s work is by no means an apologia for the old class politics. She recognizes that there
are dimensions o f injustice that cannot be reduced to class or remedied simply by
redistributive measures. She notes equally, however, that identity politics emerges in an
historical context o f economic globalization and increasing socio-economic inequality, and
that the emphasis on recognition carries with it certain political dangers. To the extent to
which it displaces concerns about economic redistribution, it can help to exacerbate sodo- economic inequality. The politics o f cultural identity as well can easily slip into a reification
of group identities, undermining individual autonomy and sanctioning intra-group
domination in the form o f gender inequalities or the silencing o f minority dissent. Thus,
Fraser argues, it is crucial to conceive o f injustice as having both redistributive and
recognitive dimensions that are intertwined and interdependent
Redistribution is a familiar concept from liberal political philosophy. “The term
‘recognition,’ by contrast, comes from Hegelian philosophy, specifically the phenomenology
o f consdousness. In this tradition, recognition designates an ideal redprocal relation
between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal and also as separate from it. This
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relation is deemed constitutive for subjectivity; one becomes an individual only in virtue of
recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject”52 The interdependency of the
redistributive and recognitive paradigms o f justice leads to a particular dilemma for Fraser.
Injustices in each paradigm reinforce one another and become a vicious circle.
Discriminatory cultural n o r m s become socio-economic institutions, apartheid perhaps being
the most egregious example. Socio-economic inequalities impede participation in social
institutions that generate cultural codes, leading to inadequate recognition o f minority
identities. For Fraser, however, the crux o f the dilemma is that while injustices in the
redistributive and recognitive paradigms reinforce each other, the remedies for such
injustices seem to be at odds. Redistribution seems to undermine group differentiations; to
accede to working-class demands is in essence to put them out o f business as a group.
Demands for remedies to a lack o f recognition, however, generally seek the valorization of
formerly despised identities, such as homosexuals; such remedies thus support or reinforce
group differentiation.
The redistributive-recognitive dilemma may seem, however, only to be a conceptual
one in so far as that, for practical purposes, remedies in each paradigm can be separated in
targeting specific groups. For instance, the answer to the problem o f the working class is
primarily redistributive. The group needs to be de-differentiated, not recognized. Similarly,
the answer to injustices perpetrated against gays is primarily recognitive. Homosexuals do
not need redistribution primarily; they need increased valorization o f their sexual orientation.
This conceptual dilemma becomes politically relevant, however, when we start ta lk in g about
‘bivalent collectivities.’ For bivalent collectivities, o f which gender and race are Fraser’s

51 Nancy Fraser. Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist ” Condition, (New York:
Routledge Press, 1997), p. 2
52 Ibid., p. 10
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prime examples, injustice has roots both in the division o f labor and hierarchal cultural
codings. “Two-dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and
misrecognition informs where neither ofthese injustices is an indirect effect ofthe other, but where both are
primary and co-otiginal.”5y Rather than decoupling cultural from social justice and classifying
groups accordingly, Fraser proposes locating groups on a continuum between tbe varying
poles o f redistribution and recognition. Groups like the working class and homosexuals lean
towards the redistributive and recognitive poles respectively, while bivalent collectivities are
placed more towards the middle.
It is in terms o f bivalent collectivities that the redistributive-recognitive dilemma is
m ost apparent. While recognitive and redistributive injustices tend to reinforce one another,
attempts at remedying these injustices can have ambivalent consequences. Recognitive
remedies can lead to exacerbating distributive inequalities. “Proposals to redress androcentric
evaluative patterns, for example, have economic implications, which can work to the
detriment o f the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress prostitution
and pornography for the sake o f enhancing women’s status may have negative effects on the
economic position o f sex workers.”54 Redistributive remedies can likewise exacerbate
misrecognition. “Means-tested benefits aimed specifically at the poor are the most direcdy
redistributive form o f social welfare. Yet such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting
them as deviants and scroungers and invidiously distinguishing tbem from ‘wage-eamers’
and ‘taxpayers’ who ‘pay their own way.’”55 Crucial to Fraser’s conception o f the dilemma o f
redistribution and recognition is the key role that increasing group differentiation plays. It is
not surprising then the extent to which Fraser emphasizes group de-differentiation as a

53 Ibid., p. 19
54 Ibid., p. 65
55 Ibid., pp. 64-5
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solution to this apparent dilemma. Fraser’s conception o f de-differentiation, however, is not
one of the assimilation o f minorities or liberal neutrality, but o f active political intervention
in overcoming hierarchies and undermining cultural binaries. In addition to overcoming the
potential pitfalls o f cultural stigmatization and economic ghettoization, group de
differentiation holds open the possibility o f building larger collective solidarities across
groups, which resonates with Benhabib’s overall project. After discussing Benhabib’s
relation to Fraser’s contemporary work, I will return to the question as to what Fraser’s
conception o f active political intervention ultimately entails.
Benhabib’s most recent work centers on the attempt to accommodate the concerns
o f multiculturalism within a deliberative democratic framework. She contrasts this approach
with the politics o f identity.
The emphasis as well as the ordering o f our principles are different. M ost democratic
theorists w elcom e and support struggles for recognition and identity/difference movem ents
to the degree to which they are m ovem ents for democratic inclusion, greater social and
political justice, and cultural fluidity. But movem ents for maintaining the purity or
distinctiveness o f cultures seem to m e irreconcilable with both democratic and more basic
epistemological considerations. Philosophically, I do not believe in the purity o f cultures, or
even in the possibility o f identifying them as meaningful discrete wholes. I think o f cultures
as com plex human practices o f signification and representation, o f organization and
attribution, which are internally riven by conflicting narratives.56

In the Claims of Culture Benhabib cites Fraser’s work for three particularly notable reasons.
First, Fraser has added to the debate over recognition empirical content and sociological
dynamics, “which had been missing in rather vague references to acknowledgement o f the
other, self-realization, self-affirmation, and the like.”57 Second, Fraser has emphasized the
particular interdependence o f redistribution and recognition. Third, and m ost importantly
for Benhabib, Fraser is suspicious o f identity politics and she supports a politics o f cultural

56 Benhabib. The C laim s o f Culture, p. ix
57 Ibid., p. 69
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dialogue over that o f preservation. In fact, part o f what Benhabib aims to do in The Claims of
Culture is to “expand Fraser’s framework in a more historical and institutional direction.”58
Benhabib’s “expansion o f Fraser’s framework” becomes clearer when viewed
through the lens o f her example concerning the allocation o f distributive benefits in the
United States. Benefit programs in the United States are divided between those that are
universalistic in scope, such as social security, and those that are often more particularistic in
scope, such as housing and educational subsidies. Given Benhabib’s endorsement o f Fraser,
it is not surprising that she is suspicious o f these more particularistic benefits. Instead, she
endorses a more universalistic perspective in the distribution o f benefits, in particular raising
the minimum wage.
It would undoubtedly affect w otkets w ho ate members o f minority cultural groups —like
blacks, Hispanics, and Asian immigrants —perhaps more disproportionately than it would
white workers; but since everyone w ho looks for a job or w ho becom es unemployed can
potentially face a minimum-wage job one day, there would be greater societal solidarity for
such a measure than for job programs targeted at specific minority groups only.”59

In Benhabib’s emphasis on group de-differentiation and cultural dialogues, her extension of
Fraser is at first seemingly apt. In her own empirical policy proposals, Fraser has emphasized
a more universalistic scheme in redistribution and a more “deconstructive” approach in
cultural politics. Benhabib’s expansion o f Fraser, however, misses a conceptual distinction
that is crucial to Fraser’s own analysis, one that actually makes Benhabib’s position closer to
that o f Habermas’ more democratically porous welfare state than Fraser’s own position.
This distinction is between that o f affirmative and transformative solutions.
Affirmative solutions for Fraser aim at altering outcomes. Transformative solutions
aim at altering the underlying structures that produce such outcomes. The distinction is
crucial to Fraser’s analysis because o f the role it plays in the recognitive-redistributive

58 Ibid., p. 71
59 Ibid., p. 76
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d ile m m a .

The ambivalences in remedies to injustice result from affirmative solutions. This

is because they solidify group differentiation. “When applied to misrecognition, affirmative
remedies tend to reify group identities. Valorizing group identity along a single axis, they
drastically simplify people’s self-understandings . .. such approaches tend to pressure
individuals to conform to the group type . .. applied to maldistribution, they often provoke a
backlash o f misrecognition.”60 Transformative solutions, by contrast, tend to undermine
group differentiation and hold up the potential for intergroup solidarity.
In the recognitive paradigm, affirmative solutions valorize the subordinated term in
a binary such as masculine/feminine while transformative solutions attempt to undermine
the hierarchy and dichotomy. “This second approach would redress status subordination by
deconstructing the symbolic oppositions that underlie currently institutionalized patterns of
cultural value. Far from simply raising the self-esteem o f the misrecognized, it would
destabilize existing status differentiation and change everyone's self-identity”61 Fraser gives
queer theory as an example o f a transformative solution that, rather than seeking to codify
and valorize a gay identity, questions the stability o f sexual orientation in general and seeks a
continuum o f fluid, shifting difference in self (ascribed)-identities. Such continuums
undermine monolithic conceptions o f groups altogether, thus alleviating the stigmatizations
o f groups that result in misrecognition. To this extent, Benhabib implicitly endorses a
transformative model o f recognition.
In the redistributive paradigm, however, Fraser identifies the welfare state as the
affirmative solution and socialism as the transformative solution, while Benhabib herself
continues to operate within the contours o f the welfare state. Contemporary politics aiming
at social justice is defined for Fraser by affirmative solutions in both paradigms, leading to

60 Nancy Fraser. Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 76
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what Fraser calls “identity politics liberalism.” A transformative account in both paradigms,
and one Fraser thinks is necessary to overcome the redistributive/recognitive dilem m a
would be a “deconstructive socialism.” Benhabib, according to this schema, occupies the
unusual position o f “deconstructive liberalism.” I f Fraser is right about how deeply
intertwined recognition and redistribution are, however, then there is reason to question the
potential coherence o f Benhabib’s account, and whether it can ultimately deliver the sort o f
increased democratic inclusion she wants from the account
Would an increase in the minimum wage, then, really make a significant difference in
recognitive and redistributive justice? Would it lead to more general social solidarity?
Certainly it would alleviate some economic injustice and relieve some kinds o f specific social
stigmatization that are associated with benefit programs targeted at specific groups. Most
prominently perhaps, it would alleviate the politics between minority groups over scarce
benefits that can tend to produce reified political blocs. That is to say, it holds real potential
to increase the social solidarity between rival minority groups and among the economically
disadvantaged more generally. But while it is ultimately an empirical question, the
assumption Benhabib makes that grounds her societal solidarity thesis, namely that everyone
who works is confronted with the possibility o f minimum wage work, I find somewhat
dubious. Sociologically, I suspect that the upper strata o f American society do not actually
confront minimum wage work; the percentage that do not psychologically confront the
possibility - in a largely optimistic population that emphasizes upward social mobility —I
would hypothesize is probably even larger. So the raise in the m inim um wage, while raising
the bar, and potentially increasing the solidarity o f those beneath it, is unlikely to make that
bar much more fluid. In terms o f associational capital —money, time, and social connections

61 Ibid., p. 75
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—the bottom strata remain relatively disadvantaged, and so it hard to see how large inroads
in democratic inclusion are being made here. A t best, large gains would be more likely to
result intergenerationally than intragenerationally, and these perhaps made more in terms o f
individual social mobility than general social equality and participation. It also unclear what
effect such a redistributive schema would have on recognitive injustices. While
compensations are more equalized, “demeaning” kinds o f work and those populations
generally subject to it are left in place. Such populations are likely to remain stigmatized.
More generally, while Benhabib’s scheme aims to de-differentiate and transform minorities,
it still tends to affirm the majority, questioning neither the relative economic hierarchy nor
privileged identities. The burden o f democratic inclusion, then, in terms o f political
participation and cultural fluidity, is ironically placed largely on the excluded. Deconstructive
liberalism, then, turns out to be far more liberal than deconstructive, and thus much more
affirmative than transformative.
Deconstructive socialism, however, is no less problematic. Fraser is unable to give
an institutional account o f socialism. In the wake o f “really existing socialism” grave worries
abound as to whether such an account can be given. Moreover, a political constituency for
socialism seems to be lacking. But is there really any more o f a political constituency for
deconstruction? Both, as Fraser recognizes, are experientially remote from the concerns of
victims o f both misrecognition and maldistribution. “More generally, transformative
strategies are highly vulnerable to collective action problems. In their pure form, at least,
they become feasible only under unusual circumstances, when events conspire to wean many
people simultaneously from current constructions o f their interests and identities.”62 While
lacking the more substantial gains in democratic participation that in principle socialism would
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foster, Benhabib’s politicallypracticable deconstructive liberalism would at least alleviate some
injustices, while avoiding the particularly pernicious ambivalences o f remedial accounts
emphasizing group differentiation. In the “postsocialist” condition, is not this a better
strategy than a conceptually unproblematic political impotence?
The dilemma o f affirmative and transformative strategies for Fraser though is no
more intractable than that between the recognitive and redistributive paradigms. What is
needed are affirmative and transformative strategies that reinforce one another. “Reforms
that appear affirmative in the abstract can have transformative effects in some contexts,
provided they are radically and consistently pursued.”63 Fraser terms such strategies “non
reformist reform.” Strategically, this means that outcome-oriented shifts alleviating injustice
are pursued in the short run that at the same time alter the balance o f power in such a
fashion that over the long term the prognosis o f transformative solutions improves. The
primary example that Fraser gives o f non-reformist reform is that o f the Unconditional Basic
Income.
At first glance, such a proposal might seem substantially similar to Benhabib’s
proposal for an increase in the minimum wage. In the short term, both are affirmative
solutions that raise the bar on the most unfortunate. The potential long-term consequences
are, however, miles apart; an Unconditional Basic Income can alter the underlying social
structures in a way that the minimum wage does not, in that it redistributes not only income
but bargaining power in the general conflict between capital and labor, removing the
traditional advantage o f surplus labor that the capitalist has in wage negotiations. Under the
Unconditional Basic Income, there would no longer be an imperative to enter the labor

62 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,
(New York: Verso, 2003), p.78
63 Ibid.
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market. This would not only be an incentive to raise wages, since basic needs could be met
I

alternatively, but an incentive to change the nature o f labor in order attract workers.
Recognitively, an Unconditional Basic Income blurs the status bar in two directions.
By not only pressuring changes in remuneration but in the structure o f work - for instance
by increasing self-determination and flexibility —the Unconditional Basic Income could blur
Jbe boundaries between previously high status and low status work for a previously lower
strata of workers. Similarly, such a policy would not only encourage a previously lower strata
o f workers to “tune in,” it would encourage a previously higher strata o f workers to “drop
out” and pursue alternative forms o f self-identity. The boundaries o f social and economic
status, which a minimum wage proposal would leave largely intact, could become blurred
under a radically and consistently pursued policy o f Unconditional Basic Income. The
consequences o f this are not only redistributive and recognitive, bu t participatory as well.
The private-public distinction in Habermas and Benhabib, while formally a continuing topic
o f debate in the civil public sphere, endorses existing liberal capitalism and the welfare state,
thus largely allowing capital to define the boundary by allowing it to structure both the
nature o f work and leisure. Proposals such as the Unconditional Basic Income, by contrast,
provide the material conditions under which such democratic deliberations about the
boundaries o f public and private, as well as about cultural codings and schemes o f
distribution, could become efficacious.

2.4 Concluding Reflections

While giving solidarity and practical reason an eminent position in discourse,
Habermas hedges on its role in the social regulation o f action. “The public opinion which is
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worked up via democratic procedures cannot itself ‘rule’ but can only channel the use o f
administrative power in specific directions.”64 With Benhabib we may counter that this
should not be for the theoretician but the participants themselves to decide. But Benhabib
perhaps overestimates the current institutionalization o f rational dialogue and the
commitments o f social actors to it to a degree that may not justify her emphasis on cultural
dialogues over judicial actions, even given Benhabib’s relative consideration o f alternative
institutional designs. But this is a social fact, not a natural property o f practical reason. If
Benhabib perhaps overestimates the current historically transformative power o f moral
dialogue, Habermas in his crisis theory o f deliberative democracy normalizes and
normativizes its increasingly anemic character. Both thinkers in their more mature work
surrender to the ‘facts’ prematurely in foreclosing the ‘anticipatory-utopian critique o f the
present.’
The full force of Habermas’ own normative theory ultimately can only be adequately
expressed in institutions very different from the liberal status quo. Habermas has attempted
to blunt these concerns by denying the thesis o f the culture industry, upon which so much o f
the focus o f the first-generation critical theorists centered. Habermas has stated in between
Facts and Norms that the thesis o f a totally administered society simply lacks empirical
confirmation. Habermas seems oddly insensitive, however, to the concern that much o f
what would stop short o f the total administration o f culture would constitute democratic deficits.
Public and private autonomy are by no means guaranteed simply because we have not (yet)
reached the point o f the direct administration o f consciousness. W hat the thesis o f the
culture industry suggests at the very least is that the integrity o f everyday communication
should not be taken for granted, and that the discursive public sphere itself, as well as the

64 Habermas. “Three Normative Models o f Democracy,” p. 250

54

arena o f social action, should be a topic o f critical discourse. W hat is needed then is an
‘anticipatory-utopian critique’ o f the present public sphere.
The risk in proposing such an anticipatory-utopian critique is that it may well fall into
a utopianism in the pejorative sense. It is against such charges that Benhabib defended
deliberative democracy against institutional realists. More specifically, any conception
oriented by Benhabib’s earlier work runs the utopian risk o f calling for an ultraindividualistic public sphere that, while calling for the accommodation o f individual lifehistories and the norms o f friendship and solidarity, simply cannot be accommodated in
complex, m odem societies. Indeed, this was precisely the charge that Nancy Fraser made
against Critique, Norm, and Utopia at the time o f its publication. While concurring with
Benhabib’s critique o f Habermas’ “generalized other,” Fraser at that time also took issue
with Benhabib’s notion o f “concrete others,” arguing that as a concept it lacked any political
import. Rather, Fraser replaced Benhabib’s individualistic “concrete others” with an
associational “collective concrete others.” Norms such as solidarity and relevant
considerations, such as life histories, are to be accommodated in discourse then through
politically constituted, concrete collectivities.
It may then seem a little ironic to propose Nancy Fraser’s current theoretical work as
a model o f anticipatory-utopian critique in and o f the public sphere. If, according to Fraser,
Benhabib’s early work was too utopian, the implicit claim in Fraser’s more recent work is
that Benhabib is not being utopian enough. The apparent irony, however, is dispelled when
we remember that in moving to questions o f politics and institutionalization in her
deliberative democratic account, questions that Critique, Norm, and Utopia failed to answer,
Benhabib adopted significantly more o f the Habermasian framework than she had in her
earlier work. The inclusion o f “concrete others” in the deliberative democratic account then
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proceeded largely through existing democratic institutions in the state and civil society. The
over-normativization o f the civil public sphere I argued was accompanied by a reification o f
existing monetary and bureaucratic institutions as the “natural” complements o f the public
sphere in modem societies. Fraser’s work, by contrast, has not exhibited such a large
theoretical shift o f emphasis. Rather Fraser’s work can be seen as a continued working-out
o f the basic structure o f Benhabib’s early work, mediating such concepts like the politics o f
transfiguration and fulfillment, in both their harmonies and tensions. The real irony then
might be that Fraser has stayed the course and developed the program outlined in Critique,
Norm, and Utopia in a more consistent manner than Benhabib herself, who in the end adopts
much o f the conservative and juridical Habermasian program that Critique, Norm, and Utopia
had originally set out to criticize.

Much o f the criticism contained herein is itself consonant with Habermas’ own
positions at the level o f normative theory. Habermas himself seems to retreat suddenly from
such an application in the face o f the fact o f pluralism, with which he concludes only liberal
institutions can contend. Habermas’ bracketing though o f socio-economic considerations
prevents him from a full consideration o f the issues, in particular the degree to which the
very institutions Habermas endorses to contend with pluralism mediate and help to
engender the particular, seemingly intractable form o f that cultural pluralism. Habermas
does not consider the extent to which strategic and antagonistic political and economic
spheres might exacerbate a seemingly ‘intractable’ pluralism. An antagonistic cultural
pluralism cannot simply be used then to justify the very arrangements that help constitute
that very antagonism and might take on very different, perhaps non-antagonistic, forms
under different social arrangements. The ‘radical democratic meaning o f society’ o f which
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Habermas approves may itself only be able to take root in a more radical institutional
arrangement The public sphere o f deliberation is n ot a natural process; it is made by us.
The question then becomes whether or n o t it gets made deliberately. Under (radically?)
different but practicable historical conditions with social actors thinking through different
social categories, the ‘force o f the better argument’ may be more binding than simple legal
conformity or fear o f prosecution is today.

While calling for an expanded autonomous sphere o f solidarity, Habermas’ insistence
that the sluices o f legitimate influence tu n only from the public sphere to the political system
makes the call unfortunately timid; its historical end point is a reflective welfare state.
Habermas then remains caught in what Benhabib previously called the “politics o f
fulfillment”65
The politics o f fulfillment envisages that the society o f the future attains more adequately
what present society has left unaccomplished. It is the culmination o f the implicit logic o f
the present. The politics o f transfiguration emphasizes the em eigence o f qualitatively new
needs, and m odes o f association, which burst open the utopian potential o f the old. Within
a critical social theory the articulation o f norms continues the universalist promise o f
bourgeois revolutions —justice, equality, cavil tights, democracy, and publicity —while the
articulation o f utopia continues the tradition o f eady socialist, communitarian, and anarchist
m ovem ents —the formation o f a community o f needs and solidarity, and qualitatively
transformed relations to inner and outer nature. In short, while norms have the task o f
articulating the demands o f justice and human worthiness, utopias portray m odes o f
friendship, solidarity, and human happiness. D espite their essential tension, a critical social
theory is only rich enough to address us in the present, insofar as it can d o justice to both

„

moments.

66

Is deliberative democracy then a critical theory o f society? In Habermas’ continuing Kantian
trajectory, the answer decidedly seems to be no. In the case o f Benhabib, the answer is more
complex. In her own early formulations o f discourse ethics, she certainly tried to do justice
to both the politics o f fulfillment and the politics o f transformation. Since deliberative

66 Benhabib. Critique, Norm and Utopia, p. 13
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democracy is grounded in discourse ethics, this suggests a possible account o f deliberative
democracy that would also try to do justice to both moments. In fact, as I suggested in my
discussion o f Habermas’ account o f the democratic tradition, deliberative democracy’s
abandonment o f liberalism’s private and fixed conception o f individual needs and rights, as
well as republicanism’s conservative and substantive ethical totalities, in favor o f free
wheeling deliberation between equal participants, suggests even a particular ‘elective affinity’
o f deliberative democracy with a politics o f transformation. Such potentials are obscured by
Habermas’ hitching o f such a conception to the issue o f the legitimation o f law in a
democratic and capitalist sociopolitical order. Benhabib herself did not follow up Critique,
Norm, and Utopia with a critical theory o f deliberative democracy. While remnants remain in
the concepts o f a more self-regulating social order and flexibility in the institutional
arrangement o f associations, these liberalizations o f Habermas’ ultimately ‘liberal’ theory o f
deliberative democracy are still aimed at norms rather than utopia. Deliberative democracy
self-consciously is conceived as an account o f existing democratic institutions and remains
therefore caught in the conceptions o f bourgeois revolutions and the ‘politics o f fulfillment.’
The reason may be in part that while, more abstractly, democracy offers tremendous
transformative possibilities —as for Marx when true democracy started history really began —
the critical theoretic tradition, running from Hegel to Marx to the Frankfurt School, offered
few resources for a concrete democratic theory. This would make the liberal, Anglo
American tradition inviting. By making liberalism its primary interlocutor and opponent,
however, deliberative democracy perhaps let it set too many o f the terms o f the debate and
wound up absorbing much o f its framework, in particular its institutional account In
addition, there has been the transformation o f an analytic distinction between
communicative and instrumental action, which opened up the possibility o f providing both
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stronger and more coherent normative foundations for critical theory, as well as tools for
more cogent social analysis, into institutional distinctions like that between the public sphere
and bureaucratic mechanisms or market society. This institutional identification has blunted
a potentially critical theory o f deliberative democracy by giving spheres a certain normative
inviolability from interference, even while in reality they are heavily mediated. A critical
theory o f deliberative democracy would start then no t with a normative idealization o f the
public sphere, but with a combination o f practical philosophy and social science in order to
show how the promise o f a vigorous public sphere is continuingly broken by cultural,
political, and economic hierarchies. This would be an ‘anticipatory-utopian critique o f the
present public sphere.’
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